Response to De Caro, Lavazza, Lemos, and Pereboom by Dennett, Daniel C.
  
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA 
DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2017.0023   
 
ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629  
Vol. 8 (2017), n. 3, pp. 274-283 
 
 
Response to De Caro, Lavazza, Lemos, and Pereboom 
Daniel C. Dennett(α)  
 
Ricevuto: 23 settembre 2017; accettato: 10 dicembre 2017 
 
 
 
 
I HAVE PUT MY COMMENTARIES in alpha-
betical order, not because I think this is “fair 
and objective” but because, as it happens, this 
order strikes me as providing the most readily 
followed path for my responses to the many 
good ideas contained in these essays, with 
forward- and backward-facing allusions kept 
to the minimum.   
 
***** 
 
I want to thank Mario de Caro for his 
sympathetic framing of the predicament I 
face on free will, having to confront Giants of 
Science while being considered by them a 
dwarf, that is, a philosopher.  It isn’t quite as 
bad as all that, at least for me, and one of my 
most delicious pleasures (usually enjoyed in 
private, not public, discussion) is rubbing the 
noses of Giants in their philosophical naive-
té. 
De Caro sees this possibility, but, gentle-
man that he is, he barely follows through; he 
could have driven home his examples of sci-
entists doing naïve philosophy.  Since scien-
tists tend to be self-confident when they ven-
ture into our precincts, we can expect them 
to dismiss charges of naiveté as just so much 
self-protective hermetically sealed “quality” 
control by nit-picking philosophers – and, of 
course, sometimes it is. But not always, and 
not here.  
In general I endorse de Caro’s comments, 
and particularly his brief account of Harris’s 
oversimple vision of free will.  As he says:    
 
So, Harris faces a problem here: if he’s real-
ly criticizing the commonsense view of free 
will, he’s reinventing the wheel.1 
 
We philosophers have been making the 
points Harris makes against various libertar-
ian versions of free will for decades if not 
centuries. The essays in this issue will show 
Harris and his fans that he has both underes-
timated the complexity of the issues and – 
much more importantly – underestimated 
the need for critics of free will to articulate 
what they plan to put in its place. Harris likes 
to dismiss my attempt to articulate varieties 
of free will worth wanting as an evasion, but 
in fact it is he who has largely ignored the ob-
ligation to say, in the wake of his self-styled 
demolition of the concept, just what adjust-
ments we should make to our institutions of 
punishment and reward, and why. 
The essays here both demonstrate the ir-
relevance of the oft-discussed neuroscientific 
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experiments inspired by Libet’s work, and 
point to more fruitful sources of empirical 
evidence we need to consider: social and po-
litical facts that are typically bracketed out of 
the thought-experimental forays. Instead of 
science-fictional accounts of logically possi-
ble manipulating neuroscientists, nearly 
identical twin deciders (Ann and Barbara), 
Plum and Mr. Puppet,2 we should look more 
closely at how we are helped and hindered by 
our friends and acquaintances, and by the 
laws and policies that enable and constrain 
these interactions, to see what differences in 
our decision-making ought to matter when 
we are assaying responsibility.  
I would also like to thank de Caro for his 
defense of my avuncularity. I would like to 
think that it is not just my advanced age that 
licenses my willingness to give friendly ad-
vice, but the fact that I have been using all 
those years to listen to my colleagues and 
learn from them, and I am still engaged in 
those tutorial sessions.  
 
***** 
 
I view Andrea Lavazza’s essay as a series of 
friendly amendments to the view I have de-
veloped over the years, and I particularly ap-
plaud his concentration on what he calls “em-
pirical free will” and I have called “practical 
free will”.3 We agree in distinguishing it from 
“metaphysical” free will, which is the fantasy 
Harris says it is. Human moral responsibility 
no more depends on metaphysical free will 
than it depends on the antique doctrine of 
immortal souls, bound for Heaven or Hell.  
I also join Lavazza in endorsing Pearl’s 
view of causation.4 I am not sure I endorse 
Ismael’s extension of Pearl’s view, which I 
have not yet had occasion to study, but it is 
certainly along congenial lines. We have to 
rinse the standard but obsolete Laplacean bil-
liard-balls model of causation out of our 
thinking.5 Lavazza notes that the Libet-
inspired experiments suggest what Caruso 
calls a “shrinking” of agency or the self, but 
they only suggest this to the unwary. In addi-
tion to the well-exposed difficulties with the 
experiments and their interpretation, of 
which Lavazza gives a good summary, there 
is the fact – obvious but seldom noted – that 
these experiments are attempts (good and 
bad) to clamp human subjects in states that 
expose the possible pathologies of machinery 
that normally churns out successful results – 
the counterparts of perceptual illusions in the 
investigation of vision and the other senses. 
We can be tweaked into revealing the less 
than perfect methods of our neural machin-
ery, but this doesn’t show that we don’t, in 
general and in more normal circumstances, 
acquit ourselves competently. Lavazza cites 
Doris,6 and I would add Doris’s more recent 
book, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Igno-
rance, and Agency,7 Doris adds valuable detail 
to the empirical perspective on the condi-
tions of rational, responsible choice. All of 
this highlights what I meant by my parenthe-
tical aphorism in Elbow Room: «If you make 
yourself really small, you can externalize vir-
tually everything».8 
Here is where my campaign to raze the 
Cartesian Theater of consciousness9 pays 
dividends in the investigation of free will. 
Harris, in effect, is tilting at windmills while 
adopting a rather Cartesian perspective of 
his own, which might be succinctly summa-
rized as “my brain made me do it!”. Well of 
course it did, but it is not something external 
to you, but rather a part of you. Once we set 
aside the first-person perspective of the Self 
trapped in the Control Room of the Brain 
and unable to have access to the subpersonal 
events that are doing all the work, we can 
make sense of the idea of practical free will, 
with rational choices implemented by sub-
personal agencies distributed in both time 
and space in the brain. We enlarge the self 
from Nagel’s10 dread “extensionless point”11 
to a more familiar and explicably capable seat 
of agency. Lavazza notes: 
 
A rational choice seems to imply a con-
scious consideration of the reasons why 
one makes a choice. Of course it can be ar-
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gued that there is no need for a thorough 
examination, minute after minute, choice 
after choice, for an action to be free. But it 
is undeniable that control over the action 
in its full unfolding cannot be separated 
from a period of time, however brief, in 
which the subject is aware of her decision 
and execution.12 
 
Actually, it is undeniable only if we extend 
the temporal window indefinitely. Consider 
the case of the factory worker who foresight-
edly handcuffs herself to safety levers that 
will jerk her hands out of harm’s way as she 
inserts new sheet metal blanks into the punch 
press. Then she doesn’t have to devote any 
attention to the intentional task of keeping 
her hands out of the press. The conscious 
choice was made weeks ago, perhaps, and 
still is in force but never reconsidered. In a 
similar spirit the subject in a Libet-style ex-
periment has made a conscious choice to 
obey the instructions as best she can, and so 
she delegates to some unknown brain tissue 
the task of jerking a left-right motor decision 
out of her at an appropriate time. 
Does she do it intentionally? Yes, of 
course, by outsourcing the triggering to some-
thing brewing in her brain, something that she 
might be completely oblivious to, but that 
might well be as detectable to the right sort of 
high-tech probing as a book of random num-
bers locked in a desk drawer. As I have said, 
the only moral to draw from Soon and col-
leagues is:13 Don’t play rock/paper/scissors 
with Soon for high stakes if your head is in an 
fMRI scanner. 
  
***** 
 
John Lemos presents his critique so clear-
ly and fairly that he almost convinces himself 
that my compatibilist view is right! In the 
end, he jumps off my bandwagon at the last 
possible moment, and at the end of my 
commentary I will try to show him how to 
climb back on. He gives a fair and accurate 
summary of my debates with Harris and 
Waller, and approves of my response to Har-
ris, but he thinks Waller shows up a flaw in 
my compatibilist/determinist account:  
 
But, as Waller shows quite forcefully, with 
his examples of Ann and Barbara, once we 
accept a naturalistic deterministic perspec-
tive we should also believe there are suffi-
cient causal conditions which are beyond 
Ann’s control which have led her to be the 
way she is and which explain why she could 
not have made the better choice which Bar-
bara made. Barbara and Ann meet Den-
nett’s requirements for morally responsible 
agency, but once we accept a deterministic 
worldview we must also concede that Ann 
has come to be who she is through factors 
beyond her control and because of who she 
is she makes the poor choice she makes.14  
 
The phrase I have italicized contains a mis-
take I have pointed out before, but not in just 
this context, so this is a useful moment. In my 
discussions of control and causation going 
back to Elbow Room and elaborated at length 
in the discussion in Freedom Evolves of the 
chess-playing computer programs competing 
against each other (see also the chapter, A 
Computer Chess Marathon in Intuition 
Pumps),15 I have pointed out that being in con-
trol is never a matter of being able to counter-
act all prevailing conditions. Determinism is 
not only not an obstacle to being in control; it 
is much easier to control things in determinis-
tic settings than when genuinely random in-
terveners are apt to interfere with one’s goals. 
This is as true of self-control as of the control 
of other things (drones, for instance). Think 
of yourself as a drone with onboard control, 
not remote control: you are “pulling the 
strings”; you are autonomous in the sense that 
no other agent is controlling you. Or as Truman 
might have put it, the buck stops with you.   
The innards of control systems must fre-
quently exploit “random” variables to handle 
conditional branching that must occur in the 
absence of sufficient information about the 
prospects of the two paths encountered – a Bu-
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ridan’s ass situation with no hint about which 
way to turn. It does not matter, metaphysically 
or morally or practically, whether the control 
system gets its random nudges from the ampli-
fication of an utterly indeterministic quantum 
event or from the emission of a pseudo-
random digit (a coin flip, in effect) from a 
pseudo-random number generator.  
Let’s think about using a coin-flip. In a 
deterministic world, coin flips are not “really 
undetermined” but they may wisely be treat-
ed as random – as our very paradigm of ran-
domness, in fact – because the “sufficient 
causal conditions” for heads or tails involve 
the location of every electron in the observa-
ble universe, something that is not possibly in 
any agent’s control – except for an omnisci-
ent, omnipotent God! (It is for this reason 
that I eventually conceded to Bob Doyle’s 
persistent search for some role – any role – 
for indeterminism in free will: I granted him 
that if I were playing rock/paper/scissors for 
high stakes with an omnipotent, omniscient 
god or demon, I would want indeterminism 
to be true. Only in that presumably unlikely 
situation would it be of any consequence to 
me, as a responsible, moral agent, to worry 
about determinism.) 
In short, the control that Ann, in Waller’s 
thought experiment, has of her choice is as re-
al as control could be, even though her choic-
es, like the choices of all non-miraculous non-
divine agents, must be determined by the in-
teraction between incompletely informed 
states of her brain and (possibly chaotic) ele-
ments that are not informed at all about rele-
vant affairs. Let us look more closely, now, at 
Lemos’s claim: 
 
there are sufficient causal conditions which 
are beyond Ann’s control which have led 
her to be the way she is and which explain 
why she could not have made the better 
choice which Barbara made. 16 
 
The first clause is true, but has no bite. A 
controller cannot control everything and 
hence cannot control all of its own controls. 
Does that obvious fact entail that nothing 
ever controls anything? That is a dire conse-
quence indeed, and amounts, in my view, to a 
threatened reductio ad absurdum of the liber-
tarian position, since invoking indetermin-
ism wouldn’t make the problem go away. 
Control is a perfectly real phenomenon in the 
world, well investigated by mathematicians 
and engineers in control theory, and they can 
readily distinguish the systems that are au-
tonomous self-controllers from those that are 
controlled by other agents, and so forth. De-
terminism does not threaten their discipline. 
The second clause hides an elision: 
 
sufficient causal conditions […] which ex-
plain why she could not have made the bet-
ter choice which Barbara made. 17 
 
Here we have to look at the logic of “could 
have done otherwise”. A deep enough analysis 
of Ann’s inner workings might show that in-
deed Ann’s reasoning and controlling prowess 
was not as powerful as Barbara’s, or it might 
instead show that the better choice was as ac-
cessible to Ann as to Barbara, only a single bit-
flip away in the ongoing processing. To illus-
trate the point by going to the limit, it could 
turn out that Ann and Barbara were infor-
mation-processing twins, both running the 
same “program” (like a chess playing program 
playing against itself), and one of them, on the 
occasion, flips a bit “at random” and branches 
on 0 while the other, in almost exactly the 
same state, branches on 1. A flip of a coin is all 
that distinguishes them, but they both had to 
flip a coin. 
Now are Waller and Lemos right that it 
would be unfair to hold Ann responsible and 
not Barbara? Why? Ann is not to be pitied 
for having a defective or morally incompe-
tent brain, for her brain is just as good as 
Barbara’s. There is nothing we would repair 
or adjust in Ann’s brain to make it more like 
Barbara’s. There is nothing for Ann to regret, 
aside from the fact that on this occasion one 
of her necessarily uninformed choices went 
sour in a way beyond her control.  
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In life you have to take your chances. 
Does this show that “it is a matter of consti-
tutive luck that when faced with the same 
choices Ann makes a poor choice and Barba-
ra makes a good choice”? I suppose in a way 
it does, but is this actually a serious objec-
tion? Is there – could there be – a coherent 
position that somehow ruled out the role of 
luck in life? We already have put in place 
many features of civilization intended to mit-
igate the role of luck, damping it down in-
stead of amplifying it, and we are busy de-
signing more and more. Many of the horrors 
and miseries of earlier ages have been, if not 
eradicated, greatly diminished, and an im-
portant aspect of the moral agency “game” 
we are invited by society to play is that it fos-
ters a policy of habitually taking steps to 
minimize the role of bad luck in our own 
dealings, not just for our own sakes, but for 
the sake of others. Reckless driving is just one 
kind of reckless self-control we condemn, 
and I do mean condemn. 
We are invited to take responsibility for 
our choices, and hence we attempt to obtain 
as much information as is practically possible 
to guide them (depending on their antici-
patable seriousness). We don’t need any fan-
tasies about “agent causation” or Ultimate 
Responsibility to ground this attitude. It is 
undoubtedly unfair to impose this daunting 
challenge and opportunity on the very young, 
the senile, and those of intermediate years 
who for one (unlucky) reason or another are 
generally unable to participate competently 
in the citizen role. But why is it unfair to 
oblige the rest to take responsibility, in re-
turn for granting them the freedom to act 
that is the particular blessing of a working 
society. The concept of “constititutive luck” 
sounds very impressive, but for the life of me, 
I cannot get it to make enough sense to wor-
ry about.   
Lemos then turns to the Libet-inspired 
literature, and notes that Mele and others 
have offered serious objections both to the 
details of the experiments and their interpre-
tation. Of course I concur; in fact, my cri-
tique of Libet’s work began with my review 
in 1979 of Popper and Eccles’ embarrassingly 
bad book, The Self and its Brain,18 and has 
continued through the years. Let me just say 
that the missteps detectable in this literature 
would take a volume to expose, without 
thereby gaining much insight into the nature 
of morally relevant decision-making.19   
So let’s turn to Lemos’s next topic, an explo-
ration of libertarian alternative views, which he 
rightly says both Harris and I find unpromising 
at best. He devotes careful attention to my 
long, sympathetic analysis of Robert Kane’s po-
sition, and he gets it right, until he comes to his 
objection: «Dennett’s critique here focuses too 
much on randomness.  On Kane’s view, free 
willed decisions are causally undetermined but 
they are not random».20  Why not?  Because 
«what she [Kane’s businesswoman, in his ex-
ample] does will not be a random happening 
but a product of her effort either way».21 No, it 
will be a product of her effort, supplemented 
(sent down one branch rather than another) 
by a quantum coin flip of one sort or another. 
Kane elaborates his position by proposing 
that the coin flip must be “responsive to the 
dynamics within the agent’s own will,” but 
this won’t do. If which way the coin flips is 
“responsive to the dynamics”, then it isn’t 
undetermined – and isn’t even pseudo-
random, isn’t really a functional coin flip. If 
the use at this time of a genuinely undeter-
mined coin flip is what Kane means by its be-
ing “responsive to the dynamics” then, once 
again, it doesn’t matter where or when the 
undetermined event that counts as the coin 
flip occurs. 
As I once put it, it doesn’t matter whether 
the winning ticket in a fair lottery is chosen 
before the tickets are sold. In a deterministic 
world all your life’s lottery tickets, all the cru-
cial items that are going to be “responsive to 
the dynamics of your will” throughout your 
life might as well be installed in your brain at 
birth. As long as no one can discover them in 
advance, you are as safe from exploitation as 
you would be with genuine contemporaneous 
random events.) 
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Lemos goes on to grant that I have some 
good objections to Kane’s position, such as 
the awkward fact that on his view we can 
never know who is morally responsible and 
who is not, but he is still not ready to settle 
into compatibilism, falling back on Waller’s 
example of Barbara and Ann, and the pre-
sumed problem of “constitutive luck.” This 
leaves Lemos in a bind: 
 
While there is not at this point sufficient 
empirical or metaphysical evidence of the 
existence of free will, there are still moral 
and pragmatic reasons for living and acting 
as if we do have free will.22  
 
It seems then that if I can succeed in per-
suading Lemos that the problem of constitu-
tive luck has been misplaced and inflated, he 
can join me, and the rest of the discussants, 
in a variety of free will worth wanting: moral 
competence and membership in a fair society 
(see my comments on Pereboom).  We will 
be acting as if we do have free will because 
we really do have this variety of free will 
worth wanting. 
 
***** 
 
Derk Pereboom identifies Frank Jackson 
and me as sharing a version of compatibilism 
that has the following property: «virtually 
everyone would qualify as a compatibilist».23 
If Pereboom is right, Jackson and I have suc-
ceeded in articulating a version of a variety of 
free will worth wanting that nobody wants to 
discard; it provides the kind of “non-basic” 
desert (if that is not a misnomer) that sus-
tains many of the features of civilized life: we 
deserve to have our promises and contracts 
honored, we deserve our political freedom of 
action and movement unless we have become 
dangers to society in one way or another, we 
deserve the penalties imposed on us by our 
societies when we knowingly violate the 
terms we have tacitly agreed to live by, etc. 
Since almost no one calls for the abolition of 
all promises and rules, returning us to some-
thing like a Hobbesian state of nature, virtu-
ally everyone could be this kind of compati-
bilist if it weren’t for the deal-breaker: there 
is no room in this view for basic desert. Jack-
son and I both think that our non-basic desert 
is “sufficient for a moral life,” as Pereboom 
puts it, so the question to be addressed is: why 
do our incompatibilist opponents insist on 
casting the free will issue in terms of basic de-
sert? We can ask libertarians: what is it about 
basic desert that makes non-basic desert a 
cheap and unworthy substitute? We can ask 
incompatibilists like Harris and Pereboom: 
what follows from your denial of “basic” free 
will that makes a moral difference? Pereboom 
says: 
 
I deny that causal determination is com-
patible with the control in action required 
for moral responsibility in the desert 
sense, and in the basic desert sense in par-
ticular. I believe that this is no small mat-
ter, since relinquishing desert would stand 
to significantly alter our practice of hold-
ing responsible and our ways of dealing 
with criminal behavior.24 
 
I agree with Pereboom about the need for 
major reforms in our policies and justifica-
tions regarding responsibility and punish-
ment, but I don’t think “causal determina-
tion” has any role to play in obliging this sal-
utary revision of common wisdom. I have 
never seen a libertarian account of desert 
that is coherent, so the incompatibility he 
sees is negligible. It is not as if we were un-
lucky to be situated in a deterministic uni-
verse that denies us the basic free will of 
which we can clearly conceive but to which, 
alas, we cannot aspire. An indeterministic 
universe could no more meet the imagined 
requirements for “basic desert” than a de-
terministic universe. Determinism is simply 
beside the point. Pereboom sees his manipula-
tion argument as raising a problem for me. I 
am not sure I see why. 
«The manipulation argument against 
compatibilism brings this disagreement to 
  Dennett 
 
280 
the fore», he says.25 This is a series of 
thought experiments in which manipulation 
by other agents is first introduced and then 
gradually reduced, leading eventually to cases 
«in which the action is causally determined 
in a natural way».26 The challenge to me is to 
identify and defend a “principled difference” 
between two roughly adjacent cases on this 
near-continuum, so that I can identify those 
agents who are not responsible for their ma-
nipulated decisions/choices/actions, while the 
rest are responsible (and deserve – in the basic 
sense – their reward or punishment, the blame 
or acclaim). I am obliged to draw and defend 
this principled distinction, Pereboom propos-
es, because although these blameworthy or 
praiseworthy choices are as determined by 
prior conditions as anything else in nature, the 
decisions are in some morally important sense 
up to the deciders. Can I point to an essential 
feature of some cases where the buck stops? 
Notice at the outset that this way of putting 
the challenge apparently presupposes a kind of 
bright line essentialism that is, in general, not to 
be found in the natural world, and not to be 
missed. There is no “principled difference” be-
tween mother and offspring in the gradual line-
age from reptiles to mammals, and yet reptiles 
are very definitely not mammals and mammals 
are not reptiles. This does not demonstrate that 
there is something illicit or incoherent or inde-
fensible about the concept of mammals, and I 
submit that nobody has shown that we need a 
concept of basic desert (or free will in some 
special sense) that doesn’t admit of degrees. Af-
ter all, we normally assume that small children 
are not fully responsible, and that they mature 
into responsibility gradually, with only arbi-
trary (not “principled”) demarcations such as 
minimal driving age, voting age, etc. 
In this regard, I think it is notable that Pe-
reboom acknowledges that even with his Case 
1, there are philosophers who disagree with his 
verdict, which is appropriately hedged: «Does 
Plum deserve to be blamed or punished for 
what he’s done? I don’t think so, and many 
others surveyed agree».27  
So with the proviso that I simply reject 
the goal of finding a bright line between Pe-
reboom’s various cases, I am happy to say 
what matters and why, the same way a biolo-
gist can list and defend the “wild type” fea-
tures of a species while acknowledging 
vagueness at the boundaries. To be eligible 
for blame, punishment, praise and reward is 
to be eligible for membership in what I call 
the Moral Agents Club (stressing that this is 
a socially constructed category). Such a mor-
ally competent agent  
 
(1) is well informed 
(2) has roughly well-ordered desires 
(3) is moved by reasons 
(4) is not being controlled by another agent 
(5) is punishable  
(6) “could have done otherwise” 
 
All these features admit of degree, and this 
isn’t a bug, it’s a feature. A brief word of ex-
planation: (5) refers to the vulnerability we 
human beings have and robots wouldn’t have 
unless steps were taken by their creators to 
give them memories and minds that could not 
be backed up, bodies that could not repaired 
indefinitely piecemeal. Superman, absent 
kryptonite, would similarly not be eligible for 
membership in the Moral Agents Club. (6) is 
to be understood in the sense – the only co-
herent sense, I claim – of the phrase that is, as 
I have shown,28 compatible with strict deter-
minism: having the relevant degrees of freedom  
(in the engineer’s sense) presupposed by (1-4). 
See my comments on Lemos for more on this. 
Pereboom acknowledges this sense: 
 
Another question one might pose is: could 
Plum have done otherwise given that the 
compatibilist conditions are met? We can 
all agree that he has the general sort of abil-
ity to do otherwise that Dennett spells out. 
He indeed does have the general ability to 
kill and to refrain from killing.29 
 
Pereboom goes on: 
 
But we can ask: could he have exer-
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cised his general ability to refrain from 
killing on this particular occasion?30 
 
We can ask, but we shouldn’t, since the an-
swer about whether or not Plum could have 
done otherwise, were every atom and particle in 
the universe in exactly the same state as in the 
actual occasion tells us absolutely nothing of 
importance about Plum’s competence or char-
acter, and so could shed no light whatever on 
whether Plum met or failed to meet some re-
quirement for desert in any sense worth our at-
tention. We can indeed ask a more reasonable 
question, about whether Plum’s self-control 
was impaired or overwhelmed on the occasion, 
but this is independent of any issue of deter-
minism.  
All this attention focused on the ultimate 
causal intricacies of decision-making doesn’t 
just entice us into metaphysical fantasy; it 
distracts us from the truly important ques-
tions we should raise about the political and 
economic conditions that might undercut the 
presumptive justification of our societal sys-
tem of blame and punishment. Pereboom’s 
sequence of examples actually illustrate the 
conditions that matter (without highlighting 
why they matter) and his proposals on this 
score are very much to the point. I agree with 
him that this goes well beyond “just positive 
and negative incentives”. The moral legiti-
macy – not mere effectiveness of control – of 
a system of laws and punishment can be 
jeopardized by empirical facts about particu-
lar kinds of causal backgrounds (poverty, 
abuse, lack of basic security and other hard-
ships), which should have a bearing on our 
decisions about blameworthiness.   
Everybody’s decisions are caused by an 
almost unimaginable commingling of factors 
both distal and proximal, both chaotic and 
regular, but sometimes there are identifiable 
features of that background that justify miti-
gation or excuse, beyond the obvious features 
already listed in my six eligibility require-
ments for membership in the Moral Agents 
Club. These requirements are balanced by 
the requirements for being a Moral Agents 
Club worth joining. This is brought out clear-
ly in new work by my colleague Erin Kelly, 
who has substantially clarified and extended 
my own thinking.  
 
Social injustice presents a dilemma for the 
prospects of criminal justice. We are torn 
between protecting some people’s basic 
rights by incapacitating dangerous of-
fenders and refusing unfairly to deprive 
offenders of their liberty when they have 
already suffered serious injustice. This di-
lemma for criminal justice cannot be 
solved in an unjust society.31 
 
A society with serious inequalities is a so-
ciety in which respect for law enforcement, 
for example, is eroded, which impacts the ef-
fectiveness of enforcement, which brings in 
its train harshness and opportunities for 
abuse of power, in a self-perpetuating spiral 
that can plunge into a failed state.  (Notice 
that this observation presupposes the underly-
ing moral competence of those on both sides 
of the social inequalities: it is just as rational 
for the severely disadvantaged to lower their 
respect for laws that unjustly penalize them 
for conditions imposed on them by inequali-
ty as it is for everyone to disrespect laws that 
oblige them to act in ignorance of the laws.) 
What should an imperfectly just society (like 
ours) do, then? Excuse everybody? No. That 
would abandon the whole point of the Club, 
which is to preserve the security of those who 
choose to make the obligatory adjustments 
and contributions of membership. 
 
If we opt for collective self-defense, even 
though it cannot be fully justified, incarcer-
ated offenders are due compensation for the 
burdens we impose on them. This might 
take the form of delivering to them some of 
the social goods they have been denied, in-
cluding education, health care, and job op-
portunities. By including elements of dis-
tributive justice in our criminal justice sys-
tem, we acknowledge the rights, welfare, 
and humanity of people we lock up. We 
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owe this to people whom we, as a society, 
have failed, and whom we are now asking to 
bear the brunt of our criminal justice efforts 
to protect other people’s rights.32 
 
This, in my opinion, is the best way to fill 
the gap left by the abandonment of such in-
defensible notions as “basic desert” and liber-
tarian free will. It provides a framework for 
Pereboom’s call for greater leniency in the 
law while maintaining something like the 
traditional idea of responsibility, shorn of 
metaphysical excesses but recognizable in its 
appeal to a defensible rendering of the re-
quirement of “could have done otherwise”.   
 I see what seems to be a clear path to 
consensus looming: we can all be compatibil-
ists who jettison retributivist notions of 
blame, while keeping a defensible justifica-
tion for a much more humane institution of 
punishment. The specter of a return to an 
amoral and chaotic state of nature is not the 
only alternative to the panicky metaphysics 
of libertarianism and retributivism. 
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